An examination of agency costs: the case of REITs

Publication Year:
2004
Usage 2029
Downloads 1437
Abstract Views 592
Repository URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/127
Author(s):
Lowrance, Daniel Scott
Publisher(s):
Texas A&M University
Tags:
corporate; mergers; poison pill; REIT
book description
This dissertation provides a comprehensive analysis of shareholder rights plans and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for a unique class of securities, i.e., the Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) between 1988 and 2000. This research seeks to establish what form of management, ownership structure and financial characteristics are exhibited by REITs which adopted antitakeover amendments as well as determine their impact on REIT values and the market for corporate control. While merger and acquisition transactions involving public REITs have much in common with M&A transactions involving other public companies, the role of governance has not been explored in REITs for these transactions. This paper finds that while firm specific variables can differentiate between targets and acquirers, the role of the governance structure appears to be quite limited. In fact, REITs seem to be driven by firm level performance.