A Deductive Justification for Inductive Belief

Publication Year:
2013
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10001
Author(s):
Raam Gokhale
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preprint description
In this paper, we utilize a disjunction of familiar inductive beliefs—the disjunction being deductively valid—to show that we have inductive knowledge. While this is in itself philosophically significant, the implications of this for a justification of induction are also explored. Induction will be found to be supported but not justified by the proposed example. Lastly deriving support from the example, an abductive justification of induction will be sketched.

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