Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10108
Author(s):
Esteban Céspedes
Publisher(s):
SICSS 2011
Most Recent Tweet View All Tweets
artifact description
One of the lessons given by the prisoners' dilemma is that collective decisions are more rational when they are based not only on evidence, but also on causal relations. This is solved by causal decision theory.   However,   the   notion   of   causation   this theory  is   based  on confronts   further  problems  in preemption   cases.   It   will   be   shown   briefly that  preemption does not occur less frequently in social and economic situations than in prisoners' dilemma and usual causal scenarios. Group decision theory and   competition   are   clear   (and   perhaps   not   the only) examples of that. It will be argued that, in order to solve a so called preemption dilemma,  the smallest theoretical alteration should be focused on preemption rather than on the dilemma. Amongst the   most   relevant   approaches,   structural   equation models and ranking analysis of causation provide appropriate answers.

This artifact has 0 Wikipedia mention.