Logical form and truth-conditions

Citation data:

Theoria (Spain), ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 28, Issue: 3, Page: 439-457

Publication Year:
2013
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10140
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.4627
Author(s):
Iacona, Andrea
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
article description
This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. Section 1 provides some preliminary clarifications.Section 2 shows that the main motivation for the view is the fact that fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented. Sections 3 and 4 articulate the view and dwell on its affinity with a conception of logical form that has been defended in the past. Sections 5-7 draw attention to its impact on three major issues that concern, respectively, the extension of the domain of formal explanation, the semantics of tensed discourse, and the analysis of quantification.

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