Marcus on belief and belief in the impossible

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Theoria (Spain), ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 28, Issue: 3, Page: 407-420

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Mark Richard
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
Arts and Humanities
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I review but don't endorse Marcus' arguments that impossible beliefs are impossible. I defend her claim that belief's objects are, in some important sense, not the bearers of truth and falsity, discuss her dispositionalism about belief, and argue it's a good fit with the idea that belief's objects are Russellian states of affairs.

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