Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 28, Issue: 3, Page: 407-420

Publication Year:
2013
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10141
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.7102
Author(s):
Richard, Mark
Publisher(s):
UPV/EHU Press; Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
article description
I review but don't endorse Marcus' arguments that impossible beliefs are impossible. I defend her claim that belief's objects are, in some important sense, not the bearers of truth and falsity, discuss her dispositionalism about belief, and argue it's a good fit with the idea that belief's objects are Russellian states of affairs.