Popper, rationality and the possibility of social science

Citation data:

Theoria (Spain), ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 28, Issue: 1, Page: 61-75

Publication Year:
2013
Usage 749
Downloads 372
Abstract Views 214
PDF Views 87
HTML Views 64
Link-outs 12
Captures 41
Exports-Saves 28
Readers 13
Social Media 1
Tweets 1
Citations 1
Citation Indexes 1
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10188
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.1879
Author(s):
Danny Frederick
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
Most Recent Tweet View All Tweets
article description
Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationality, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical rationality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper's conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism.

This article has 0 Wikipedia mention.