Causation: Many words, one thing?

Citation data:

Theoria (Spain), ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 27, Issue: 2, Page: 203-219

Publication Year:
2012
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10252
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.4067
Author(s):
Lorenzo Casini
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
article description
How many notions of cause are there? The causality literature is witnessing a flourishing of pluralist positions. Here I focus on a recent debate on whether interpreting causality in terms of inferential relations commits one to semantic pluralism (Reiss 2011) or not (Williamson 2006). I argue that inferentialism is compatible with a 'weak' form of monism, where causality is envisaged as one, vague cluster concept. I offer two arguments for this, one for vagueness, one for uniqueness. Finally, I qualify in what sense the resulting form of monism is 'weak'.

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