Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 27, Issue: 2, Page: 223-227

Publication Year:
2012
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Repository URL:
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17448; http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10253
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.6223
Pitt D-Scholarship Id:
17448
Author(s):
Machery, Edouard
Publisher(s):
UPV/EHU Press; Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco; Philosophy Documentation Center
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
article description
In this article, I argue that philosophers' intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people's and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.