Expertise and Intuitions about Reference

Citation data:

Theoria, ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 27, Issue: 1, Page: 37-54

Publication Year:
2012
Usage 146
Downloads 146
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10258, http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17455
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.3482
Pitt D-Scholarship Id:
17455
Author(s):
Edouard Machery
Publisher(s):
Philosophy Documentation Center, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
article description
Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions—a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

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