Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 25, Issue: 2, Page: 137-147

Publication Year:
2010
Usage 70
Downloads 70
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10313
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.635
Author(s):
Oms, Sergi
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
article description
Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden's view with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account.