Is There A Specific Experience of Thinking?

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 25, Issue: 2, Page: 187-196

Publication Year:
2010
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10318
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.640
Author(s):
Jorba Grau, Marta
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
article description
In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.

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