Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10363
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.439
Author(s):
Catherine Z. Elgin
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
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article description
The Structure of Appearance presents a phenomenalist system, constructing enduring visible objects out of qualia. Nevertheless Goodman does not espouse phenomenalism. This is not because he considers his system inadequate. Although details remain to be filled in, he considers his system viable. And he believes his constructional methods could readily yield extensions to other sensory realms. Why isn’t Goodman a phenomenalist? This paper suggests an answer that illuminates Goodman’s views about the nature and functions of constructional systems, the prospects of reductionism, and the character of epistemology. These non-standard views present attractive alternatives to currently popular positions.

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