Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10364
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.440
Author(s):
Marcus Rossberg, Daniel Cohnitz
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
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article description
It has repeatedly been argued that nominalistic programmes in the philosophy of mathematics fail, since they will at some point or other involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we will argue that this is not the case. Using an idea of Nelson Goodman and W.V. Quine’s which they developed in Goodman and Quine (1947) and supplementing it with means that should be nominalistically acceptable, we present a way to explicate logical consequence in a nominalistically acceptable way.

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