Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either)

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 24, Issue: 1, Page: 29-47

Publication Year:
2009
Usage 110
Downloads 110
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10377
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.382
Author(s):
Verdejo, Víctor M.
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
article description
Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to accommodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defender of IRS can still offer a satisfactory account in terms of the inferential capacities of rational thinkers.