Perfectioning trust, reinforcing testimony

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 23, Issue: 1, Page: 73-76

Publication Year:
2008
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10407
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.8
Author(s):
Gil, Francisco Javier
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
article description
Miranda Fricker characterizes the most basic or primary form of epistemic, testimonial injustice by way of a set of negative delimitations. In this paper I raise some doubts about how these delimitations are drawn, about the wrongful harms and disadvantages the testimonial injustice is supposed to entail and produce, and about the way Miranda Fricker clarifies the perfectionist character of the corrective virtue on the part of hearers, the ethical and intellectual virtue of testimonial justice.

This article has 0 Wikipedia mention.