Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10427
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.465
Author(s):
Coll Mármol, Jesús
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
article description
This paper is an examination and evaluation of McDowell’s criticisms of Davidson’s views on conceptual schemes and empiricism. I will argue that McDowell does not understand the real nature of Davidson’s arguments against the scheme-content dualism and that his new empiricist proposal fails to solve all the problems that old empiricism has traditionally raised. This is so because Davidson does not try to reject only a certain conception of experience by rejecting the dualism of scheme and content, but a way of thinking about meaning and knowledge that assumes a dualism that cannot be maintained.

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