Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10433
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.478
Author(s):
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
article description
Moran conceives of conscious belief as a conscious activity, rather than awareness of a mental state. Once conscious belief is understood in this way, the notion of suppressed belief becomes problematic. In this paper, I draw on the work of Merleau-Ponty to sketch an account of suppressed belief. I suggest that suppressed beliefs should not be understood as attitudes towards propositions. Instead, they should be conceived as ways of perceiving and interacting with the world that are out of keeping with how one represents it as being.

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