Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action

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THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 22, Issue: 1, Page: 25-33

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Prades, Josep L
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
article description
In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional action presents a certain unresolved tension. On the one hand, the epistemic privilege of the first person derives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of the subject endorsing a course of action. An endorsing subject is not a mere observer of her intentions. On the other hand, the transparency of endorsement is assimilated to the putative fact that an agent forms her intentions by reflecting on the reasons to make up her mind. The resulting picture is an extremely rationalistic account of intentional action. I will try to defend that this form of practical rationalism can be avoided without renouncing the basic intuitions be-hind Moran’s use of the notion of endorsement.