Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10456
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.537
Author(s):
Murali Ramachandran
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Most Recent Tweet View All Tweets
article description
This paper defends a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions mentioned in the literature, and responds to Timothy Williamson’s charge that any such analysis is futile because knowledge is semantically un-analyzable. The response, in short, is that even though such an account may not offer a reductive analysis of knowledge—by way of more basic, non-circular concepts—it still has an explanatory advantage over Williamson’s own position: it explains how belief can fail to be knowledge.

This article has 0 Wikipedia mention.