How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 21, Issue: 2, Page: 185-194

Publication Year:
2006
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10456
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.537
Author(s):
Ramachandran, Murali
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
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article description
This paper defends a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions mentioned in the literature, and responds to Timothy Williamson’s charge that any such analysis is futile because knowledge is semantically un-analyzable. The response, in short, is that even though such an account may not offer a reductive analysis of knowledge—by way of more basic, non-circular concepts—it still has an explanatory advantage over Williamson’s own position: it explains how belief can fail to be knowledge.