On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 21, Issue: 1, Page: 39-48

Publication Year:
2006
Usage 179
Downloads 179
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10463
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.552
Author(s):
Mauricio SUÁREZ; Albert SOLÉ;
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
article description
In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.