Gómez-Torrente on Modality and Tarskian Logical Consequence

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 18, Issue: 2, Page: 159-170

Publication Year:
2003
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10527
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.419
Author(s):
García-Carpintero, Manuel
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
article description
Gómez-Torrente’s papers have made important contributions to vindicate Tarski’s model-theoretic account of the logical properties in the face of Etchemendy’s criticisms. However, at some points his vindication depends on interpreting the Tarskian account as purportedly modally deflationary, i.e., as not intended to capture the intuitive modal element in the logical properties, that logical consequence is (epistemic or alethic) necessary truth-preservation. Here it is argued that the views expressed in Tarski’s seminal work do not support this modally deflationary interpretation, even if Tarski himself was sceptical about modalities.