Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10528
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.420
Author(s):
William H. Hanson
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
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article description
The time-honored view that logic is a non-empirical enterprise is still widely accepted, but it is not always recognized that there are (at least) two distinct ways in which this view can be made precise. One way focuses on the knowledge we can have of logical matters, the other on the nature of the logical consequence relation itself. More specifically, the first way embodies the claim that knowledge of whether the logical consequence relation holds in a particular case is knowledge that can be had a priori (if at all). The second way presupposes a distinction between structural and non-structural properties and relations, and it holds that logical consequence is to be defined exclusively in terms of the former. It is shown that the two ways are not coextensive by giving an example of a logic that is non-empirical in the second way but not in the first.

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