Conceptions of the mind... that do not loose sight of logic

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 18, Issue: 1, Page: 17-25

Publication Year:
2003
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10536
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.407
Author(s):
Acero, Juan José
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
article description
Which is the relation between logic and philosophy of mind? This work tries to answer that question by shortly examining, first, the place that is assigned to logic in three current views of the mind: Computationalism, Interpretativism and Naïve Naturalism. Secondly, the classical debate between psychologism and antipsychologism is reviewed –the question about whether logic is or not a part of psychology- and it is indicated in which place of such debate the three mentioned conceptions of mind are located.