Scientific Practice and Necessary Connections

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 29, Issue: 1, Page: 29-39

Publication Year:
2014
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10651
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.7118
Author(s):
Hüttemann, Andreas
Publisher(s):
UPV/EHU Press; Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
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article description
In this paper I will introduce a problem for at least those Humeans who believe that the future is open. More particularly, I will argue that the following aspect of scientific practice cannot be explained by open-future-Humeanism: There is a distinction between states that we cannot bring about (which are represented in scientific models as nomologically impossible) and states that we merely happen not to bring about. Open-future-Humeanism has no convincing account of this distinction. Therefore it fails to explain why we cannot bring about certain states of affairs, it cannot explain what I call the "recalcitrance of nature".