Causation and the Agent’s Point of View

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 29, Issue: 1, Page: 133-147

Publication Year:
2014
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10656
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.6952
Author(s):
Álvarez Toledo, Sebastián
Publisher(s):
UPV/EHU Press; Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
article description
There are philosophers who deny that causal relations actually exist in nature, arguing that they are merely a product of our perspective as beings capable of intentional actions. In this paper I briefly explain this thesis and consider that it needs to be complemented with a basic non-causal ontological perspective which can account for phenomena taken as causal; I then describe what seems to be a good candidate for such an ontology and finally conclude, however, that it cannot dispense with the concept of causation and that therefore is not the kind of ontology that anti-realism about causal relations requires.