The logic of confirmation

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Philosophische Perspektiven, Page: 309-315

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Huber, Franz
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article description
The paper presents a new analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy (Hempel 1945), differing from the one in Carnap (1962). Hempel, so it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true theories, and another aiming at informative theories. However, so the analysis continues, he also realized that these two concepts were conflicting, and so he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. It is then shown that one can have the cake and eat it: There is a logic of confirmation that accounts for both of these two conflicting aspects.