The knowability argument and the syntactic type-theoretic approach

Citation data:

Theoria (Spain), ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 29, Issue: 2, Page: 201-221

Publication Year:
2014
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10864
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.7225
Author(s):
Lucas Rosenblatt
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
article description
Recently, there have been some attempts to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Principle or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the prospect of using the truth predicate to emulate necessity, knowledge and other modal notions. It turns out that this idea works much better.

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