Meta-incommensurability revisited

Citation data:

Theoria (Spain), ISSN: 2171-679X, Vol: 29, Issue: 2, Page: 243-259

Publication Year:
2014
Usage 229
Downloads 167
Abstract Views 35
HTML Views 23
Link-outs 3
PDF Views 1
Captures 2
Exports-Saves 1
Readers 1
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10867
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.7125
Author(s):
Hyundeuk Cheon
Publisher(s):
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
conference paper description
A popular rejoinder to the potential threat that incommensurability might pose to scientific realism has been the referential response: despite meaning variance, there can be referential continuity, which is sufficient for rational theory choice. This response has been charged with meta-incommensurability, according to which it begs the question by assuming a realist metaphysics. However, realists take it to be a rhetorical device that hinders productive discussion. By reconstructing the debate, this paper aims to demonstrate two things. First, there are unexpected commonalities between realists and non-realists, meaning that the charge of meta-incommensurability is more or less exaggerated. Second, meta-incommensurability, which is to be found in the ways to make sense of referential overlap at the token level, still plays a role in the realism debate.

This conference paper has 0 Wikipedia mention.