Aggregating Causal Judgments

Citation data:

Philosophy of Science, ISSN: 0031-8248, Vol: 81, Issue: 4, Page: 491-515

Publication Year:
2014
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11364
DOI:
10.1086/678044
Author(s):
Bradley, Richard; Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian
Publisher(s):
University of Chicago Press
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
article description
Decision making typically requires judgments about causal relations: We need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals’ causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. Finally, we revisit the aggregation of probabilistic judgments when this is constrained by prior aggregation of qualitative causal judgments.