What is it like to be a group agent?

Publication Year:
2015
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11569
Author(s):
List, Christian
preprint description
The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? In this paper, I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness, contrary to a recent suggestion by Schwitzgebel (2015). In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.