Intentional Models as Essential Scientific Tools

Citation data:

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ISSN: 0269-8595, Vol: 27, Issue: 2, Page: 199-217

Publication Year:
2013
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11714
DOI:
10.1080/02698595.2013.813251
Author(s):
Eric Hochstein
Publisher(s):
Informa UK Limited, Taylor & Francis Group
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
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article description
In this article, I argue that the use of scientific models that attribute intentional content to complex systems bears a striking similarity to the way in which statistical descriptions are used. To demonstrate this, I compare and contrast an intentional model with a statistical model, and argue that key similarities between the two give us compelling reasons to consider both as a type of phenomenological model. I then demonstrate how intentional descriptions play an important role in scientific methodology as a type of phenomenal model, and argue that this makes them as essential as any other model of this type. © 2013 Open Society Foundation.

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