The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 30, Issue: 1, Page: 43-52

Publication Year:
2015
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12125
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.11725
Author(s):
Schupbach, Jonah N.
Publisher(s):
UPV/EHU Press; Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
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article description
In (Schupbach 2008), I put forward a "possibility result" for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there exist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply that coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, Schubert (2012) argues that the specific ceteris paribus conditions I consider are "jointly inconsistent". In this article, I prove to the contrary that these conditions can consistently be enforced while allowing degrees of coherence to vary. Next, I consider a related criticism, inspired by Olsson's (2005) constraints on ceteris paribus conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle(s) that should guide one in choosing appropriately stringent ceteris paribus conditions.