Explanation Beyond Causation? New Directions in the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation

Publication Year:
2016
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12519
Author(s):
Reutlinger, Alexander
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preprint description
In this paper, I aim to provide access to the current debate on non-causal explanations in philosophy of sciences. I will first present examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences. Then, I will outline three alternative approaches to non-causal explanations – that is, causal reductionism, pluralism and monism – and, corresponding to these three approaches, different strategies for distinguishing between causal and non-causal explanation. Finally, I will raise questions for future research on non-causal explanations.