Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12603
Author(s):
Colombo, Matteo, Lai, Jun, Crupi, Vincenzo
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preprint description
Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those that advocate the “1/2 view” and those that advocate the “1/3 view.” One source of disagreement between advocates of different views concerns the evidential relevance of self-locating information. Unlike halfers, thirders regard self-locating information as evidentially relevant in the Sleeping Beauty Problem. The present study advances the debate, providing a more nuanced and empirically grounded account of the evidential impact of self-locating information. By systematically manipulating the kind of information available in different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem, we show that human reasoners acknowledge self-locating evidence as relevant, but discount its weight. This indicates that patterns of judgment on different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem do not fit either the “1/2 view” or the “1/3 view.” Our results suggest that an adequate explication of the evidential relevance of self-locating information should take into account that self-locating information may trigger more cautious judgments of confirmation than familiar kinds of statistical evidence.

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