Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12845
DOI:
10.20416/lsrsps.v3i1.603
Author(s):
Carl Hoefer
Publisher(s):
Societe de Philosophie des Sciences, Société de philosophie des sciences
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article description
One currently popular view about the nature of objective probabilities, or objective chances, is that they – or some of them, at least – are primitive features of the physical world, not reducible to anything else nor explicable in terms of frequencies, degrees of belief, or anything else. In this paper I explore the question of what the semantic content of primitive chance claims could be. Every attempt I look at to supply such content either comes up empty-handed, or begs important questions against the skeptic who doubts the meaningfulness of primitive chance claims. In the second half of the paper I show that, by contrast, there are clear, and clearly contentful, ways to understand objective chance claims if we ground them on deterministic physical underpinnings.

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