Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones

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THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 32, Issue: 1, Page: 41-62

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Pérez Otero, Manuel
UPV/EHU Press; Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Arts and Humanities
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E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke's anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that -according to them- reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses, for reasons that -as far as I know- have not been pointed out so far. Furthermore, their vignettes are apparently inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.'s theses depend on an unjustified assumption: there is not expertise regarding intuitions.