Desacuerdo lógico y agregación

Citation data:

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 32, Issue: 1, Page: 63-87

Publication Year:
2017
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12878
DOI:
10.1387/theoria.15716
Author(s):
Diego Tajer
Publisher(s):
UPV/EHU Press, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Tags:
Arts and Humanities
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article description
In this paper, I explore the possibility of applying the methods and results of Judgement Aggregation to the problem of logical disagreement. I develop and evaluate different ways in which individuals who logically disagree can generate a collective logic. I prove a version of the discursive paradox, where the majority voting of a group of structural logicians can give rise to a substructural logic; then I develop a more general impossibility result. After this, I analyze different ways to avoid the paradox, in particular some methods which appeal to domain restrictions. Finally, I consider the application of these results to the discussion on semantic paradoxes.

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