Does weak discernibility determine metaphysics?

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THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, ISSN: 0495-4548, Vol: 32, Issue: 1, Page: 109-125

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Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart
UPV/EHU Press; Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del PaĆ­s Vasco
Arts and Humanities
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article description
Two entities are weakly discernible when there is an irreflexive and symmetric relation holding between them. That weak discernibility holds in quantum mechanics is fairly uncontroversial nowadays. The ontological consequences of weak discernibility, however, are far from clear. Recently, part of the literature seems to imply that weak discernibility points to a definite metaphysics to quantum mechanics. In this paper we shall discuss the metaphysical contribution of weak discernibility to the metaphysics of quantum mechanics and argue that, contrary to part of current literature, it does not provide for a fully naturalistic determination of the theory's metaphysics. Underdetermination still obtains.