Dynamic Humeanism

Citation data:

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, ISSN: 0007-0882

Publication Year:
2017
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13097
DOI:
10.1093/bjps/axx006
Author(s):
Hicks, Michael Townsen
Publisher(s):
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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article description
Humean accounts of laws of nature fail to distinguish between dynamic laws and static initial conditions. But this distinction plays a central role in scientific theorizing and explanation. I motivate the claim that this distinction should matter for the Humean, and show that current views lack the resources to explain it. I then develop a regularity theory which captures this distinction. My view takes empirical accessibility to be one of the primary features of laws, and I identify features laws must have to be empirically accessible. I then argue that laws with these features tend to be dynamic.