Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13257
DOI:
10.1086/693989
Author(s):
Brandon Boesch
Publisher(s):
University of Chicago Press
Most Recent Tweet View All Tweets
article description
Callender and Cohen (2006) argue that there is no need for a special account of the constitution of scientific representation. I argue that scientific representation is communal and therefore deeply tied to the practice in which it is embedded. The communal nature is accounted for by licensing, the activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish a representation. A case study of the Lotka-Volterra model reveals how the licensure is a constitutive element of the representational relationship. Thus, any account of the constitution of scientific representation must account for licensing, meaning that there is a special problem of scientific representation.

This article has 0 Wikipedia mention.