Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13305
Author(s):
Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann
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preprint description
The technique of imaging was first introduced by Lewis (1976), in order to provide a novel account of the probability of conditional propositions. In the intervening years, imaging has been the object of significant interest in both AI and philosophy, and has come to be seen as a philosophically important approach to probabilistic updating and belief revision. In this paper, we consider the possibility of generalising imaging to deal with uncertain evidence and partial belief revision. In particular, we introduce a new logical criterion that any update rule should satisfy, and use it to evaluate a range of different approaches to generalising imaging to situations involving uncertain evidence. We show that none of the currently prevalent approaches to imaging allow for such a generalisation, although a lesser known version of imaging, introduced by Joyce (2010), can be generalised in a way that mitigates these problems.

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