Why the Naïve Derivation Recipe Model Cannot Explain How Mathematicians’ Proofs Secure Mathematical Knowledge

Citation data:

Philosophia Mathematica, ISSN: 0031-8019, Vol: 24, Issue: 3, Page: 401-404

Publication Year:
2016
Usage 6
Abstract Views 4
Full Text Views 2
Captures 3
Readers 3
Social Media 1
Tweets 1
Citations 1
Citation Indexes 1
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13423
DOI:
10.1093/philmat/nkw012
Author(s):
Larvor, Brendan
Publisher(s):
Oxford University Press (OUP); OUP
Tags:
Mathematics; Arts and Humanities
Most Recent Tweet View All Tweets
article description
The view that a mathematical proof is a sketch of or recipe for a formal derivation requires the proof to function as an argument that there is a suitable derivation. This is a mathematical conclusion, and to avoid a regress we require some other account of how the proof can establish it.