Ontic Structural Realism and Natural Necessity
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J. Ladyman (1998-2009), Ladyman and Ross (2007) refine J. Worral's (1998) structural realism (SR), by developing an ontic structural realism (OSR) which they argue is a consistently naturalistic means of characterizing the ontology of fundamental physics. I argue that particular elements of M. Lange (2009) and M. Eklund (2006) strengthen and refine their project of characterizing fundamental physics via OSR and by extension, their presentation of information-theoretic structural realism (ITSR). I demonstrate this point by situating M. Lange’s (2009) discussion of nomological modality and natural necessity within Ladyman and Ross’s discussion of ITSR. The logical hierarchy evinced in Lange’s (2009) notion of ‘nomic stability’ further refines Ladyman and Ross’s claims through the addition of nuanced modal distinctions in a systematic framework. Moreover, I argue that what Lange considers are the ‘lawmakers’ (viz. subjunctive facts) serve as a de dicto rendition of some of Ladyman & Ross’s fundamental de re extensions and refinements of ‘real patterns’ (Dennett, 2001).