Sufficient Reason and Reason Enough

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Foundations of Science, ISSN: 1572-8471, Vol: 21, Issue: 3, Page: 455-460

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Romero, Gustavo E.
Springer Nature; Springer
Multidisciplinary; Arts and Humanities
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article description
I offer an analysis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and its relevancy for the scientific endeavour. I submit that the world is not, and cannot be, rational—only some brained beings are. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not a necessary truth nor a physical law. It is just a guiding metanomological hypothesis justified a posteriori by its success in helping us to unveil the mechanisms that operate in Nature.