THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW METAPHYSICS FOR QUANTUM MECHANICS FROM MEINONG'S THEORY OF OBJECTS

Citation data:

Probing the Meaning of Quantum Mechanics, Page: 280-307

Publication Year:
2016
Usage 149
Downloads 149
Social Media 4
Tweets 4
Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14414
DOI:
10.1142/9789813146280_0012
Author(s):
Graffigna, Matías
Publisher(s):
World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt; World Scientific
Most Recent Tweet View All Tweets
conference paper description
According to de Ronde it was Bohr's interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) which closed the possibility of understanding physical reality beyond the realm of the actual, so establishing the Orthodox Line of Research. In this sense, it is not the task of any physical theory to look beyond the language and metaphysics supposed by classical physics, in order to account for what QM describes. If one wishes to maintain a realist position (though not nave) regarding physical theories, one seems then to be trapped by an array of concepts that do not allow to understand the main principles involved in the most successful physical theory thus far, mainly: the quantum postulate, the principle of indetermination and the superposition principle. If de Ronde is right in proposing QM can only be completed as a physical theory by the introduction of `new concepts' that admit as real a domain beyond actuality, then a new ontology that goes beyond Aristotelian and Newtonian actualism is needed. It was already in the early 20th century that misunderstood philosopher Alexius von Meinong proposed a Theory of Objects that admits a domain of being beyond existence-actuality. Member of the so called `School of Brentano', Meinong's concerns were oriented to provide an ontology of everything that can be thought of, and at the same time an intentionality theory of how objects are thought of. I wish to argue that in Meinong's theory of objects we find the rudiments of the ontology and the intentionality theory we need to account for QM's basic principles: mainly the possibility of predicating properties of non-entities, or in other words, the possibility of objectively describing a domain of what is, that is different from the domain of actual existence.