Meaning, Truth, and Physics

Citation data:

Making it Formally Explicit, ISSN: 2365-4228, Page: 165-177

Publication Year:
2017
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Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12891; http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14769; http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13378
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-55486-0_9
Author(s):
Szabo, Laszlo E.
Publisher(s):
Springer Nature; Springer International Publishing
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book chapter description
A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system (L,S), where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is regarded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course incompatible with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an account for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the formalist philosophy of mathematics.