Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2210
Author(s):
Dominika Yaneva
preprint description
The validity of 3 premises, set as foundational pillars of modern sociological approach to science, is contested, namely: i/ the postulate, stating that science is devoid of whatever generis specifica ii/ it is liable to the usual empirical study iii/the practicing scientist’s self-reflexive judgements must be disbelieved and rejected. Contrariwise, the ignored so far quaint nature of knowledge, escaping even from the elementary empirical treating – discernment & observation – is revealed and demonstrated. This peculiar nature requires, accordingly, a specific meta-cognitive dealing for positing it as ‘empirical object’, unfortunately missed by the Strong Programme. The inadequate approach adopted led to a substitution of ‘scientific’ for common knowledge. The tacit thus far alternative methodology, setting the foundations of meta-science, is outlined.

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