Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3109
Author(s):
Hattiangadi, Jagdish
conference paper description
Scientists apply Bacon’s investigative induction by first cataloguing experimental discrepancies among apparent natures of things. Induction begins by multiplying discrepancies, thus creating a puzzle with multiple clues. Solved puzzles thus give us power to produce those unusual, discrepant effects. Bacon’s experimental method, however, is not empiricist. Grasping things empirically, like receiving impressions on a wax tablet, presupposes that our senses cannot deceive us whenever we are deceived: we err in our interpretations. Empiricism thus leaves no objective discrepancies to resolve, as deception resides in our interpretation. Scientific induction, for all its success, becomes invisible to modern empiricist methodologists