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J. C. P. Oliveira
preprint description
In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly on Carnap's work. One aspect of this revisionism is the thesis that Carnap's later writings are compatible with Kuhn and even that Carnap anticipates some relevant points of Kuhn's theory of science. In this paper I argue against the revisionist's interpretation of the fact that Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the compatibility between Carnap's and Kuhn's respective philosophies of science. I claim that from Carnap's point of view the book by Kuhn is not in philosophy of science, but rather in history of science, and so there is no justification for the revisionist idea that Carnap would have found 'Structure' philosophically congenial. I support my criticism on the fact that Carnap never refers to Kuhn in his work and that Hempel - who was at a different time a friend and collaborator of Carnap and of Kuhn - never refers to the supposed philosophical affinity between the two authors.

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