Repository URL:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8552
Author(s):
David Rose, Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Edouard Machery
preprint description
Chandra Sripada's (forthcoming) Deep Self Concordance Account aims to explain various asymmetries in people's judgments of intentional action. On this account, people distinguish between an agent's active and deep self; attitude attributions to the agent's deep self are then presumed to play a causal role in people's intentionality ascriptions. Two judgments are supposed to play a role in these attributions — a judgment that specifies the attitude at issue and one that indicates that the attitude is robust (Sripada and Konrath, forthcoming). In this article, we show that the Deep Self Concordance Account, as it is currently articulated, is unacceptable.

This preprint has 0 Wikipedia mention.